We develop a rational expectations model in which the issuer of a nancial instrument purchases credit ratings(s) in order to provide useful information to investors and attract investor demand. We examine the nature of a credit-rating equilibrium in a staged game in which an issuer purchases rating(s) sequentially and then decides which ratings to disclose. Our analysis emphasizes the importance of opacity about the contacts between the issuer and various rating agencies, leading to potential asymmetric information by investors about which ratings have been obtained. Too many ratings are potentially produced and rating agencies are able to extract rents in equilibrium. While the structure of equilibrium forces the disclosure of ratings when the market knows that these have been produced, in some situations investors are unsure as to whether ratings have been obtained that have not been disclosed. Absent disclosure requirements (the opaque case), ratings bias would arise whenever the equilibrium involves publication of fewer ratings than the number of ratings available to the issuer. However, investors understand the structure of equilibrium and adjust asset pricing to eliminate the potential bias in pricing.
Introduction
In the aftermath of the nancial market crisis there has been a considerable spotlight on the accuracy of credit ratings and the potential for upward bias in these, especially in light of the issuer paying for preliminary (or indicative) ratings and selectively publishing and disclosing those to be available for the marketplace to consider in evaluating complex nancial instruments. 1 This context raises fundamental questions about the nature of equilibrium. To what extent are the communications that happen prior to the disclosure of the rating publicly available? Under what conditions do the ratings disclosed re ect selective disclosure in equilibrium and bias to which investors would like to adjust? This is central to understanding the nature of credit ratings that are disclosed and the implications for asset pricing.
While ratings bias emerges in the literature under a variety of assumptions in which investors react myopically to ratings, it is important to address whether the incentives to shop for ratings and selectively disclose disappear under rationality. 2 For example, is the rationality of investors su cient to guarantee unbiased ratings? Would the enforcement of mandatory disclosure of the issuer's interaction with the rating agency guarantee unbiased ratings?
A potential source of ratings bias is the ability of issuers to obtain preliminary (or indicative) ratings from rating agencies without being required to disclose these contacts. Of course, disclosure about such ratings could take a variety of forms such as mandatory disclosure of the information provided by the rating agency, disclosure of the contact of a particular rating agency by the issuer in the speci c context (e.g., the underlying information might be complex and for which it would be too di cult to mandate disclosure of the fundamental information), or, as has been the case historically, the contact has been viewed as private. Indeed, the economics of the context could point to the universality of such contacts as when the costs of obtaining indicative ratings are su ciently low, which often has mirrored the past practice. This discussion suggests a number of policy issues including what types of disclosure should be required and the incentives between the stages of purchasing an indicative rating and disclosing that rating. It also emphasizes the importance of the form of equilibrium. Under rational expectations disclosure of contacts with the rating agency is very powerful and can eliminate ratings bias.
We develop a rational expectations framework in which the issuer can help convey information to the market by using ratings agencies. We examine the impact of transparency at the ratings stage. In addition to mandatory disclosure of all ratings we focus upon two disclosure alternatives|one in which all contacts for ratings are transparent and an opaque alternative in which the contacts are not disclosed. If the disclosure of indicative ratings already purchased is costless, then in this equilibrium all purchased ratings are disclosed, implying that ratings shopping and ratings bias do not arise. In the spirit of Akerlof (1970) , when publication is costless investors would form an extremely adverse inference when indicative ratings were not disclosed. More generally, if it is common knowledge that a set of ratings have been purchased, then all of these must be disclosed.
In contrast, in the absence of any disclosure requirement about ratings contacts (the opaque case) ratings shopping and ratings bias would arise whenever the equilibrium entails publication of fewer ratings than the number of indicative ratings purchased|as the issuer would then selectively choose which ratings to publish and would choose the highest ratings obtained (e.g., if publishing only one rating, then the issuer would publish the highest rating). Discretionary disclosure arises in equilibrium in the opaque case because the issuer can avoid a completely adverse inference as investors do not know whether ratings are not being disclosed because they were not obtained and therefore unavailable, or because the ratings were su ciently adverse. 3 In the former case, the inference from the absence of a (second) rating would not be adverse.
More speci cally, consider a game in which there are two rating agencies and the issuer decides sequentially whether to purchase the second rating after observing the rst rating. If the rst rating is su ciently high (i.e., over a relevant threshold), then the issuer would conclude that it doesn't need to expend resources for an additional rating, while if the rst rating is lower than the threshold, then the issuer purchases a second indicative rating and then discloses it (but not the rst rating) if it is over the same threshold. Notice that only a single rating is disclosed when either rating is su ciently strong. Otherwise (when both ratings obtained are below the threshold), both ratings are disclosed (the inference would be even less favorable if only one rating were disclosed and it were below the threshold or if none were disclosed). When a single rating is disclosed in this equilibrium, because of the common threshold applied to both rating agencies the investor is unable to distinguish the cases in which this rating was obtained from the rst rating agency or from the second. 4 Of course, there is rating bias in the scenario when one rating is disclosed. The bias results from the possibility of being in the situation in which the second rating was over the threshold (and then the rst rating was below the threshold).
Our paper contributes to the literature on discretionary disclosure as the source of asymmetric information arises endogenously in our setting (e.g., compare to Dye (1985) , Shin (2003) and Acharya, DeMarzo and Kremer (2010) ). In these papers the source of uncertainty (whether the manager has a signal or is uninformed) is exogenous.
While we are able to show that an equilibrium emerges without ratings bias under speci c conditions (such as transparency of ratings contacts), the opaque case makes clear that the absence of bias is not a robust or universal outcome of our model|even under the assumption of rational expectations. Recent empirical evidence in Kronlund (2011) suggests that ratings shopping has distorted the actual ratings on corporate bonds (ratings are relatively higher for issues that are more likely to experience ratings shopping). Yet interestingly, Kronlund's evidence suggests that investors adjust for this in market pricing, despite the selection and bias in the underlying ratings (yields adjust to the biased ratings). In e ect, the market pricing re ects the potential winner's curse associated with the choice of rating agencies (also see discussion in Sangiorgi, Sokobin and Spatt (2009)). We note that these broad themes from our theoretical speci cation are not dependent upon the speci c assumption of two rating agencies and are valid even if there are many rating agencies. 5
Ratings bias and overproduction of information (and excess rents to the rating agencies) will arise more generally (for many rating agencies) in the opaque equilibrium, while the transparent equilibrium will not have ratings bias and will be e cient. This leads to an important normative implication of our paper{that issuers should be required to disclose their receipt of preliminary ratings. Indeed, the SEC formally proposed such a rule in the fall of 2009, but the regulation has not been adopted so far and became a lower regulatory priority when it was not included as part of the Dodd-Frank Act's requirements for credit rating agency regulation.
Ratings shopping has had a number of other impacts on recent policy debates. For example, the New York State Attorney General's 2008 settlement with the three major rating agencies mandating fees at the indicative ratings stage (though not barring them at the disclosure stage) attempted to reduce ratings shopping (O ce of New York State Attorney General, 2008). The greater the fee at the indicative stage the fewer the ratings that will be obtained and the more limited the scope for selective disclosure and ratings shopping. Additionally, ratings bias (which arises in the opaque scenario) would undercut the appropriateness of reliance on ratings for regulatory purposes. 6 Critics of rating agencies have suggested that ratings shopping and the ability of the issuer to choose its rating agencies is an important con ict of interest that 5 Becker and Milbourn (2011) study the impact of the introduction of Fitch in the marketplace upon the ratings issued by Moody's and S&P. They nd that these ratings are relatively higher after the introduction of Fitch and that competitiion through shopping intensi ed then.
6 The Dodd-Frank Act mandates that U.S. regulators no longer rely on ratings for regulatory purposes. How domestic (and especially international) regulators implement this in various contexts is still evolving. distorts the ratings process.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the underlying speci cation of the model and the disclosure policy in the presence of common knowledge. Section 3 addresses the equilibrium in a transparent market and Section 4 examines the equilibrium in an opaque market. Section 5 concludes.
Setup
An issuer is endowed with one unit of an asset with random payo
The issuer is risk neutral, and has an exogenous holding cost for the asset equal to V . The issuer can either hold the asset or sell it to the market, which is populated by a continuum (with mass equal to one) of risk-averse investors. Investors have CARA preferences with common absolute risk aversion coe cient r. A riskless asset is traded in perfectly elastic supply with net return normalized to zero. All players have rational expectations and zero discount rates. Ex-ante, the issuer and the investors share the same prior information about the asset value. When the asset is priced according to prior information only, the issuer sells to investors for p 0 = X r 2 X ;
implying ex-ante gains from trade equal to V r 2 X :
We assume > 0.
The issuer can in uence investors' valuation of the asset by conveying information to the market via rating agencies (RAs). We assume there are two such agencies, endowed with the same rating technology: each rating agency can produce at a cost H an unbiased noisy signal, or rating S i = X + " i ; for i = 1; 2; with " i uncorrelated with X; i.i.d. and
" i N (0; 2 " ):
Hence, the two rating agencies have equivalent, but independent technologies. Each RA maximizes pro ts by setting the fee c i at which the issuer can purchase its rating, with the constraint that c i H:
The rating process is as follows. The issuer can approach RA i and purchase its rating at cost c i ; in which case the RA produces the rating S i ; which is communicated to the issuer. At this point the issuer owns the rating and can either withhold it or make it public through the rating agency. Only in the latter case would investors observe the rating. A crucial feature of the rating process that plays a major role in our analysis is its degree of transparency. The rating process can be either transparent or opaque, depending on whether or not the act of purchasing a rating is observable by investors. If the market is opaque, all that investors observe are the purchased ratings that the issuer voluntarily decides to publish.
The timing of the model is as follows.
1. RAs simultaneously post fees c 1 ; c 2 : Fees are observed by all players.
2. The issuer shops for ratings. The issuer can shop sequentially, that is, can purchase a rst rating, and decide whether to purchase the second rating based on the realization of the rst rating.
3. After the purchased ratings are observed, the issuer decides which purchased ratings to disclose (if any).
4. The asset is sold to investors for the price p. The payo X is realized and consumption takes place.
At any point in the time interval (1; 4), the issuer can decide to stop the game and hold the asset, in which case her payo equals the risk-neutral valuation of the asset given the information she has acquired up to that point net of the holding cost V: In other words, the issuer participation constraint (IPC) needs to be satis ed not only ex-ante, but also at any interim stage.
We remark that the setup we consider is one in which there is no ex-ante information asymmetry between the issuer and the investors. There are ex-ante gains from trade and information is potentially valuable in that it increases investors' demand. There is no agency problem on the part of the rating agencies: purchased ratings are unbiased and reported truthfully. Investors have rational expectations and understand the incentives behind the issuer's actions. Consequently, the outcomes of the model are not driven by investors' naivet e.
We specify our framework to focus on the strategic aspects of discretionary disclosure that emerge as a consequence of opacity, building from the microstructure of credit ratings, as the more traditional impact of disclosure cost as a source of discretionary disclosure is well understood (e.g., see Verrecchia (1983) ) and isolating the strategic aspects that emerge endogenously is unique to our framework. Disclosure costs per se would be an important ingredient in focusing upon the incentives of rating agencies, but we abstract from the underlying con ict of interest and agency issues that the rating agencies face. We also collapse any di erential between the credit rating ultimately adopted by the rating agency and the preliminary or indicative rating conveyed in the rst stage (slippage from these initial rating assessments) and any security design (such as tranching) issues that would arise at an ex ante stage as these would reinforce the degree of opacity or asymmetric information. We also observe that there is not evidence in practice of substantial di erences between preliminary ratings and the nal ratings that are formally published.
This setup represents a somewhat idealized situation in which many of the concerns regarding the rating industry in recent years have been resolved. Still, from a positive perspective, some questions remain. For example, is investors' rationality su cient to guarantee unbiased ratings? Will incentives to shop for ratings and to selectively disclose high ratings disappear in this case? Also, from a normative perspective: do ex-ante costs eliminate ratings shopping? If enforced, does mandatory disclosure of purchased ratings guarantee unbiased ratings?
The solution concept implemented is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). In this rating game, a PBE consists of a strategy pro le for the issuer, a price function, and a belief system held by investors such that the strategies are sequentially rational given the belief system and the belief system is consistent given the strategy pro le.
Value of information, surplus and e ciency
The issuer's payo from selling the asset to investors equals the asset price net of the costs incurred to purchase ratings. The CARA-normal framework implies that, conditional on the issuer disclosing all purchased ratings, the asset price equals the conditional expectation of the fundamental minus a risk discount that is proportional to the conditional variance. Therefore, ex-ante, the issuer expects
where, informally, I denotes the information set available to investors in equilibrium. Information is therefore valuable, ex-ante, because it reduces the risk premium. Taking into account the cost of information production, H, the net value of information, , is de ned as = max n2f0;1;2g
Then, the potential surplus is de ned as the sum of the ex-ante gains from trade and the net value of information: + :
Let denote the issuer's ex-ante expected equilibrium pro ts net of the ex-ante value of the outside option (holding the asset), that is
where E(costs) denotes the expected value of the fees that are going to be paid to RAs during the game. RAs pro ts equal such costs net of the information production cost H. Then, the equilibrium surplus is de ned as + RAs pro ts.
Therefore, we say that an equilibrium is e cient if + = + RAs pro ts, that is, if i) trading takes place, and ii) the e cient amount of information is produced and transmitted.
Disclosure policy with common knowledge
Given the assumed ownership structure of ratings, the issuer always has the option of disclosing information selectively. For example, she could purchase one rating and disclose it only if this rating is good enough, or she could purchase both ratings and disclose only the best of the two and so on. Selective disclosure induces a selection bias in the ratings that are published and results in ratings bias. Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) formalize with intuition under the assumption of naive investors. With rational investors, an obvious question is whether this option is viable in equilibrium. Assume that investors know, or correctly anticipate, which ratings are purchased. This does not mean that investors observe the realization of the ratings of course, unless ratings are published. Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Unraveling) Given common knowledge that there have been n purchased ratings, n ratings are disclosed.
The idea behind this result is simple and well understood. As a simple illustrative example, let r = 0 and assume that in equilibrium the issuer is expected to purchase one rating and to disclose it only if S i S: Then, conditional on no disclosure, the price re ects E Xj S i < S < S. But for all signal realizations S i 2 (E Xj S i S ; S), the issuer would get a better price by disclosing, which yields a contradiction. The unraveling result is undone if there are disclosure costs (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983) or some exogenous source of uncertainty about whether a player has information to disclose (e.g., Dye, 1985) . As we do not make any of these assumptions, ratings bias from selective disclosure cannot arise in this framework unless some degree of uncertainty is endogenously created in equilibrium.
Equilibrium in the transparent market
This section describes the equilibrium of the model under the assumption that the rating process is transparent: investors are assumed to observe which ratings are purchased. This will provide a benchmark against which we can compare the model's predictions in the opaque case. The model is solved backwards. First we determine the issuer's strategy for exogenously given costs. An immediate consequence of Lemma 1 is that in the transparent market, each purchased rating will be disclosed. Denote with 2
XjS the variance of X conditional on one rating and with 2 Xj2S the variance of X conditional on two ratings. De ne
The following Lemma describes the issuer's decision regarding how many ratings to purchase.
Lemma 2 For c c l the issuer purchases both ratings, for c l < c c h the issuer purchases only one rating, and for c > c h no rating is purchased.
The threshold values in (4) have a very clear economic interpretation. c h represents the exante marginal value of purchasing the rst rating. It equals the reduction in the risk premium (the second term in eq. (1)) the issuer expects from disclosing one rating over disclosing no rating. Similarly, c l equals the marginal value of the second rating. Ratings are imperfect substitutes in this framework, and the incremental reduction in uncertainty decreases with the number of ratings, implying c h > c l . The value of ratings is related to the value of information: c l and c h are increasing in risk aversion and the variance of the fundamental. In the risk neutral case c l = c h = 0 and costly ratings would never be purchased.
Equilibrium in the fee-setting game
Next, we endogenize the fees as the result of competition between the two rating agencies. We assume that fees are announced simultaneously by the rating agencies at the beginning of the game, and that renegotiation is not possible. The next Proposition describes the equilibrium in the transparent market.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium in the transparent market is one of the following:
1. for H c l , RAs set c 1 = c 2 = c l and the issuer purchases both ratings;
2. for c l < H c h , RAs set c 1 = c 2 = H and the issuer purchases only one rating;
3. for H > c h no rating is purchased.
The proof of the Proposition also shows how the IPC is never binding in the case. The following properties of this equilibrium are worth mentioning.
Equilibrium always exists, and the value of information is maximized. The equilibrium is therefore e cient.
Depending on the primitives, the issuer could purchase either zero, one or both ratings, but in equilibrium does not condition the decision of purchasing the second rating on the value of the rst rating (so the solution in this case is identical whether the preliminary ratings are provided to the issuer sequentially or simultaneously).
In the risk neutral case (or r su ciently small), no rating is purchased for H > 0.
The issuer is always better o in equilibrium with RAs than without and strictly better o if at least one rating is purchased in equilibrium, that is, if > 0: Figure 1 provides a numerical illustration of the equilibrium. The thick line is potential surplus, + : The gray and light gray areas represent issuer's pro ts from eq. (3) and RAs pro ts, respectively. As the equilibrium is e cient, the sum of the two equals potential surplus. Moreover, RAs make positive pro ts only if H < c l , when both ratings are purchased and RAs are therefore not competing. As c l < H c h ; only one rating is purchased and competition in fees drives pro ts to zero, so that in this region issuer's pro ts equal total potential surplus, = + . As H > c h , the net value of information, , is equal to zero, so that the asset is sold to investors without acquiring any rating, and issuer's pro ts equal the gains from trade, = : 
Equilibrium in the opaque market
This section analyzes the case in which investors cannot observe the number of purchased ratings, and highlights the di erent properties of the resulting equilibrium.
Equilibrium selective disclosure
In the opaque market, asymmetric information is more severe. In fact, the issuer has private information on which ratings are purchased. Unless both ratings are disclosed, investors do not observe the number of purchased ratings. In this case investors will form beliefs about the number of purchased ratings, and will assign probabilities to the unobservable event in which the issuer is disclosing information selectively. In equilibrium, such probabilities are correct, and, by Lemma 1, strictly less than one. We therefore distinguish two types of equilibria, depending on whether the probability that investors assign (along the equilibrium path) to the issuer disclosing selectively is zero or positive. The following analysis shows how both types of equilibria are possible in the opaque market regime. We remark that the source of uncertainty about whether the issuer has information to disclose is not exogenously assumed, but is instead derived as part of the equilibrium with ratings shopping. We will refer to the case in which the equilibrium probability of selective disclosure is zero as a full disclosure equilibrium.
O -equilibrium beliefs
In a candidate equilibrium, the issuer is expected to follow a given purchasing and disclosure rule. In the opaque market, if investors observe a set of ratings which is o -equilibrium, the deviation could be consistent with the issuer deviating from the purchasing rule or the disclosure rule or both. For these o -equilibrium information sets we specify investors beliefs explicitly. There are three relevant types of such o -equilibrium information sets.
B1. Investors observe a higher number of ratings than expected. Then we assume investors attach probability one to the o -equilibrium path in which the number of purchased ratings equals the number of observed ratings.
B2. Investors expect only rating i to be published, and observe instead only rating j. Then we assume investors attach probability one to the o -equilibrium path in which the issuer purchased both ratings but only disclosed rating j:
B3. Investors observe a lower number of ratings than expected. Then, we distinguish two cases. Either: a) given fees c 1 ; c 2 , the observed ratings are consistent with a di erent equilibrium path. Then we assume investors adjust their beliefs consistently with the equilibrium path that yields the lowest price among those equilibrium paths the observed ratings are compatible with; b) condition a) is not satis ed, in which case investors attach probability one to the o -equilibrium path in which the issuer disclosed information selectively.
The role of re nement (B3-a) is to restore uniqueness of equilibrium whenever harsh oequilibrium beliefs would sustain multiple equilibria. This re nement is conservative in that, in the presence of multiplicity, the most ine cient equilibria are ruled out.
Full disclosure equilibria
Here we focus on equilibria in which the issuer discloses all purchased information. Denote with (y) the CDF and with f (y) the PDF of a Standard Normal valued at y, and de ne the function g (y) := y (y) + f (y):
From the respective de nitions it follows that:
The following Lemma describes the purchasing decision of the issuer for an exogenous set of fees, and is a counterpart of Lemma 2 for the case of opaque contacts.
Lemma 3. Assume the IPC is satis ed ex-ante. Then:
i) c i 6 = c j : For max fc i ; c j g <ĉ l , the issuer purchases both ratings; for min fc i ; c j g <ĉ h and max fc i ; c j g ĉ l the issuer purchases only the cheaper rating, and for min fc i ; c j g ĉ h no rating is purchased.
ii) c i = c j = c: For c <ĉ h the issuer purchases both ratings and for c ĉ h no rating is purchased.
A rst qualitative di erence with Lemma 2 is that in the case of symmetric costs, the equilibrium in which the issuer purchases and discloses only one rating does not arise. The reason is as follows. When the issuer can shop for ratings sequentially in an opaque market, there would always exist a su ciently bad realization of the rst purchased rating that the issuer would nd it pro table in expectation to purchase and disclose the second rating. Because of symmetry in the rating costs, she is ex-ante indi erent between purchasing one rating or the other. Therefore investors can only expect one rating, but not a speci c one, implying that as long as only one rating is published, they cannot detect any deviation, making the deviation pro table. More generally, interim asymmetric information in uences the equilibrium in this context: the issuer cannot refrain from shopping for more ratings and disclosing selectively unless shopping costs (the fees) are su ciently high. As a result, in order to sell the asset to investors and realize the gains from trade, the issuer might purchase ratings at \unfair" prices, which allows RAs to extract rents. As a consequence, the amount of information produced in equilibrium can be ine ciently high. As an illustration, consider the case with risk neutral investors, r = 0, in which the social value of information (2) is zero. In the transparent benchmark, the e cient outcome is implied by Lemma 2: for r = 0 and c > 0 the issuer sells the asset to investors without acquiring any rating, realizing the ex-ante gains from trade . As g (0) > 0, the thresholdsĉ l andĉ h are strictly positive even with r = 0, implying that, surprisingly, ratings retain positive value in equilibrium even if information has no social value.
RAs exploit this to extract more surplus. In this case with r = 0, RAs extract surplus from the gains from trade . The outcome is therefore ine cient for all positive costs of information production, H > 0:
Threshold equilibria and ratings bias
Here we describe a situation in which the issuer discloses information selectively with strictly positive probability along the equilibrium path. Our framework provides a natural case in which this may happen. Intuitively, the issuer could purchase a rst rating and then decide to shop for the second rating only if the rst rating is not good enough. If the second rating happens to be high, then the issuer might want to publish only this one and hide the rst, less favorable, rating. Of course, for this option to be viable, it has to be that investors in equilibrium are uncertain as to whether the rating that is published is the result of selective disclosure or not. We formalize this intuition in the following de nition. In the following, we relabel ratings so that S 1 is the rst rating that ends up being purchased, and S 2 the second one. With symmetry, this is without loss of generality of course, as the issuer is indi erent between which rating to purchase rst and randomizes over the two.
De nition 1. A constant S and a price function p S ( ) constitute a threshold equilibrium if:
1. the following strategy is optimal for the issuer: purchase a rst (randomly selected) rating, S 1 , and then:
(a) disclose S 1 and stop if S 1 S, (b) purchase the second rating if S 1 < S; and then:
i. disclose only S 2 if S 2 S;
ii. disclose both ratings if S 2 < S;
2. p S ( ) is consistent with the strategy of the issuer.
Under this conjecture, only two scenarios are possible: either investors observe both ratings with value below S, or a single rating, which we denote S p ; with value above S: Whenever both ratings are observed, investors' inference problem is straightforward, and the price of the asset equals p(S 1 ; S 2 ) = E ( Xj S 1 ; S 2 ) r 2 Xj2S :
Whenever a single rating is observed, this is either the result of the rst rating being high enough, S p = S 1 S, or of the rst rating being low and the second being high, that is, S p = S 2 S and S 1 < S. In essence, along the conjectured equilibrium path, the distribution of the rating S p is a mixture of these two truncated distributions. An immediate consequence of this is that the distribution of the published rating S p is upward biased. 7 Investors' inference problem in this case is more complicated. In fact, the distribution of the fundamental X conditional on the information conveyed by S p is a mixture of two distributions: prob ( Xj S p ) = (1 q (Sp) )prob ( Xj S p = S 1 ) + q (Sp) prob Xj S p = S 2^S1 < S ;
where q (Sp) denotes the posterior probability that the issuer disclosed information selectively, conditional on the value of S p : As a consequence, investors' end-of-period wealth, by trading in the asset, is not conditionally normally distributed. Therefore, we show below, the equilibrium price p S ( ) is a non-linear function of the rating. Let p (S i ) denote the price conditional on one rating under full disclosure p(S i ) = E ( Xj S i ) r 2 XjS :
De ne the following function
In the Appendix we show the price p S (S p ) to be
Intuitively, p S (S p ) < p(S p ), as investors adjust pricing in response to the winners' curse implicit in only one rating being published. The following Proposition shows conditions under which such an equilibrium arises.
Proposition 2. Let c i = c j = c. Then, there exist functions v( ) and s( ) < p 0 and a constant c t >ĉ l , such that S = s(c) and the price function given in (7) constitute a threshold equilibrium whenever c t <ĉ h for all c 2 [c t ;ĉ h ) and V v(c):
The Proposition implies that the issuer shops for the second rating only if the rst purchased rating happens to be below p 0 , the price at which the asset would be sold based on prior information only. The requirement that the cost must be higher than a minimum c t follows from the fact that the issuer must not nd it pro table to deviate from the equilibrium strategy and shop for the second rating if S 1 S. The minimum requirement on the holding cost V ensures that the IPC is satis ed ax-ante and in any state along the equilibrium path. The condition 7 More formally, denote with D1; D2 the sets of states of the world in which, respectively, only S1 and only S2; are published. Let the variable Sp be de ned as taking values
Then, the bias, b, is de ned as b := E ( S p Xj ! 2 D) :
It is straightforward to verify that b > 0: c t <ĉ h is a necessary condition for existence of the threshold equilibrium and depends on the primitives of the model. Whenever this is satis ed, the equilibrium strategies in Lemma 3 and Proposition 2 can be combined to illustrate the unique equilibrium strategy of the issuer for a given symmetric value of the costs.
Lemma 4. Assume the IPC is satis ed ex-ante, c t <ĉ h and let c i = c j = c: For c < c t the issuer purchases and discloses both ratings; for c 2 [c t ;ĉ h ) the issuer follows the threshold strategy of De nition 1, and and for c ĉ h no rating is purchased.
We remark that, in the opaque case, whenever equilibrium involves publication of fewer ratings than the number of ratings potentially available (i.e., only one rating), the distribution of these ratings is upward bias.
Equilibrium in the fee-setting game
In order to describe the outcome of the model in the opaque case, the nal step is to determine the equilibrium in the fee-setting game among RAs. For a given equilibrium to arise, a rst necessary condition is that the ex-ante IPC is satis ed. The value of the issuer's outside option at the ex-ante stage, X V , is compared to the ex-ante pro ts corresponding to a given equilibrium. The relevant quantities are the issuer's expected pro ts when two ratings are purchased and disclosed X r 2 Xj2S 2c;
and when the issuer follows the strategy of Proposition 2
where B denotes the set of states in which only one rating is published along the path of the threshold equilibrium. The value v(c) in Proposition 2 is such that the ex-ante pro ts in (9) exceeds the outside option for all V v(c): De ne c 2 as the value of the fees that equates the outside option with (8)
and letc = min fĉ t ;ĉ h g :
The next Proposition describes the symmetric equilibrium in the opaque market.
Proposition 3. The equilibrium in the opaque market is one of the following:
1. The equilibrium involves the issuer purchasing and disclosing both ratings if H c 2 and H <c. Then: for c 2 <c, RAs set c = c 2 , while for c 2 c, any c 2 [maxfH;ĉ l g;c)
constitutes an equilibrium in fees.
2. The equilibrium has the form of Proposition 2 whenever c t <ĉ h and H 2 [c t ;ĉ h ) and V v(H).Then RAs set c = H:
3. If H ĉ h , no rating is purchased in equilibrium.
4. If neither of the above holds, RAs set c = H, no rating is purchased and there is no trade. Figure 2 shows the unique outcome of the model in the opaque market for values of the holding cost V 2 [r 2 X ; 2r 2 X ], for values of the information production cost H 2 [0;ĉ h ), and xed values of other parameters. From Proposition 3, for H ĉ h , the asset is sold without any rating being purchased in equilibrium. The gray area corresponds to the full disclosure equilibrium with two ratings; the light gray area corresponds to the threshold equilibrium. As the gure shows, ceteris paribus, the threshold equilibrium arises more often for larger values of V and H. High values of the holding cost V could represent situations in which issuers' incentives to sell the asset are high because of high opportunity costs. High values of H might re ect the larger costs it takes to produce a rating for more complex securities. Finally notice that, when neither conditions in 1-2 of Proposition 3 hold, no equilibrium in which the asset is sold to investors exists, which corresponds to the two empty areas in the Figure. In both cases the selling motive of the issuer is not su ciently high. In one case ratings are too expensive for the issuer to purchase both, but not su ciently high for the threshold strategy to be an equilibrium. In another case ratings are too expensive for the issuer to purchase them according to the threshold strategy, but not su ciently high for the issuer to credibly commit not to purchase any. In these cases, the asymmetric information problem induced by opacity and ratings shopping is so severe that the market breaks down, the issuer holds the asset and ex-ante valuable trading does not take place. Figure 1 illustrates the impact of opaqueness on equilibrium in terms of e ciency and distribution of surplus. Ine ciency is measured by the vertical distance between the thick line, representing potential surplus, + , and the sum of RAs and issuer's pro ts. With opaqueness the equilibrium is ine cient for all H > c l . Ine ciency is the result of ine cient over-production of information. Also, the distribution surplus is greatly a ected. In this numerical example c 2 <c, so that, from Proposition 3, in the equilibrium in which both ratings are purchased RAs set c = c 2 and extract all the surplus (including the ex-ante gains from trade). For H high enough (H c), the economy in in the threshold equilibrium, in which competition in fees drives RAs pro ts to zero. In this equilibrium the issuer's pro ts are positive. In the numerical example,c < c h , so for c H < c h the net value of information is positive and the issuer gets part of it, while for c h H <ĉ h producing information is ine cient and issuer's pro ts are reduced below the ex-ante gains from trade, < : Issuer's pro ts equal only if H ĉ h , in which case fees are high enough that the issuer can credibly commit not to purchase any rating and sell the asset. 
Endogenous opaqueness
So far we discussed the degree of transparency of the rating process as an exogenous variable. A natural question is which regime would RAs choose if they could. More formally, assume each RA can independently choose the transparency regime as a strategic variable. The contract would therefore specify both the fee at which the rating is sold, and whether the RA would communicate to investors that the rating has been purchased. By Lemma 1, whenever this announcement is credible, as we assume here, purchased ratings are disclosed by the issuer. Therefore, choosing a transparent regime is in fact equivalent to RAs disclosing the purchased rating automatically. Fees and transparency regime are then announced simultaneously by RAs at the beginning of the game and such announcement is observed by all players. The rest of the game is unchanged. The next proposition establishes whether the equilibrium outcomes described in Propositions 1 and 3 are robust to this extension.
Proposition 4. When the degree of transparency is endogenously determined, then: i) the opaque market equilibrium of Proposition 3 is una ected, and ii) the transparent market equilibrium of Proposition 1 is not an equilibrium outcome unless H ĉ l .
Given the previous discussion on the welfare properties of the di erent regimes, it is not surprising that the opaque regime emerges as an equilibrium, while the transparent does not.
Enabling the issuer with the option to disclose the rating is bene cial to RAs, and allows them to extract rents in equilibrium.
Concluding comments
Our paper uses a model based upon rational expectations to examine conditions under which selective disclosure and ratings bias emerge in equilibrium. We highlight the role of the structure of equilibrium and regulatory policy about disclosure of contacts with rating agencies to purchase ratings. For example, under some conditions requiring the disclosure of the existence of indicative ratings may be equivalent to requiring disclosure of the indicative ratings themselves, eliminating ratings bias in equilibrium. However, even mandatory disclosure of contacts about indicative ratings may not be fully e ective in eliminating bias and selective disclosure in a setting in which informal discussions between the issuer and the rating agencies can take place prior to the indicative ratings stage. In the absence of requiring disclosure of the contacts about indicative ratings (the opaque analysis), ratings bias can emerge even under rational expectations.
The type of analysis we undertake in this paper also is relevant for understanding empirical aspects of credit ratings|especially multiple and split ratings. The information content in ratings re ects not only the ratings selected for publication and disclosure, but also indicative ratings (even though unobservable) that are not selected (also discussed in Sangiorgi, Sokobin and Spatt (2009)). For example, our analysis suggest that at the most favorable rating obtained, the larger the number of these ratings the more favorable the information content as it implies the absence of fewer ratings at lower levels. A similar analysis can apply to split ratings. This also suggest the adverse nature of the absence of ratings (e.g., unrated securities), especially when the costs of ratings are very low. 8 In our opaque equilibrium the observation of a single rating would be less favorable than two ratings at the same level (see equation (7)). For example, unless the costs are especially high, unrated instruments are likely to re ect especially adverse information. 9 More generally, these types of models highlight the information content of published ratings at various levels.
Our formal analysis does highlight two reasons why issuers might want to publish multiple ratings, even absent regulatory requirements to obtain multiple ratings. Because investors are risk averse, additional ratings reduce the required risk premium, o ering more precision about the underlying signal. 10 Additionally, to the extent that investors expect the issuer to solicit multiple ratings, absence of publication suggests adverse information, and implies an information discount relative to the issues with public ratings. Indeed, multiple ratings are published with positive probability. In fact, the second motive for multiple ratings is valid even in a risk-neutral setting. These motives tie closely to the \information production hypothesis" and \shopping hypothesis" in Bongaerts, Cremers and Goetzmann (2012) .
The focus in our paper on opacity and the structure of equilibrium also is relevant for a broader range of applications beyond our focus on credit rating agencies. For example, consider the situation in which "test takers" can request that only their highest score on a particular subject or exam be reported to outsiders. This would lead to considerable "excess" testing and the ability of the testing body or institution to extract additional rents from that process. 11 More generally, the endogenous structure of economic activity is an important potential source of information asymmetry that in uences the analysis of institutional arrangements.
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Appendix A: Notation
Let X N ( X ; 2 X ) and S i = X + " i ; with " i N (0; 2 " ) for i = 1; 2. Let X, " 1 and " 2 be uncorrelated. De ne
and let 2 XjS = Var ( Xj S i ) ; 2 Xj2S = Var ( Xj S i ; S j ) ;
2 SjS = Var ( S j j S i ) : Then, we have the following standard results
where 2 XjS = 2 SjS In this CARA-normal framework, the asset price conditional on, respectively, zero, one and two ratings being published (and full disclosure) are
Appendix B: Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Lemma 2
Notice that, from Lemma 1, purchased ratings are always disclosed. Also,we assume that, when indi erent, the issuer purchases more ratings. We solve backwards for the decision of how many ratings to purchase. If the issuer has purchased two ratings, nal payo s equal p(S 1 ; S 2 ) 2c: One step back: if the issuer has purchased one rating, say, S 1 ; then she can either disclose the rating and stop, in which case payo s equal p(S 1 ) c; or purchase the second rating. Expected payo s from purchasing the second rating, conditional on S 1 equal
The issuer will purchase the second rating if and only
In other words, conditional on having purchased a rst rating, the issuer will purchase the second rating i c c l , regardless of the value of the rst rating. Anticipating this, and going back to the decision of purchasing the rst rating, the issuer will compare payo s from selling the asset without having purchased any rating, p 0 ; with the expected payo s from selling the asset having purchased and disclosed one rating (if c > c l ), or two ratings (if c c l ). Therefore, if c > c l ; the issuer will purchase the rst rating i
and if c c l ; the issuer will purchase the rst rating i
Simple algebra shows 
Proof of Proposition 1
1. For H < c l , any c 2 [H; c l ) is not a Nash equilibrium in the fee-setting game as a RA can deviate to c + " < c l and its rating will be purchased. Similarly, c > c l is not an equilibrium either as only one rating is purchased, and each RA expects c=2: By deviating to c " with " > 0 su ciently small, a RA's rating is purchased with probability one, making the deviation pro table. Similar argument holds for c > c h . Instead, at c = c l both ratings are purchased and no deviation can be pro table as more expensive ratings are not purchased.
For c l
H < c h , any c > H cannot be an equilibrium as a deviation to c " with " > 0 su ciently small is pro table since the rating would be purchased with probability one. For c = H, there is no incentive to deviate as more expensive ratings would not be purchased.
Follows trivially from Lemma 1 and c H:
Finally, notice that issuer's expected pro ts with endogenous costs are not smaller than (0; c) by construction, implying that the IPC is always satis ed.
Proof of Lemma 3
Denote n i for i = 0; 1; 2 the conjectured equilibrium in which the issuer purchases and discloses n ratings. We identify necessary conditions for n i to be an equilibrium.
i) Let c i 6 = c j , and relabel RAs so that c 1 < c 2 : Consider n 0 rst. In an opaque market, the issuer could deviate and purchase rating 1. Given B1, for the deviation not to be pro table, it has to be E [max fp(S i ); p 0 g] c 1 p 0 ;
or, equivalently
which by direct computation gives
The r.h.s of (16) provides the expression forĉ h in the text. From (16) it follows that min fc i ; c j g ĉ h is necessary for n 0 to be an equilibrium. 12 Next, consider n 1 : in equilibrium the issuer solicits only one rating, which investors anticipate to be rating 1, the cheaper rating. Upon observing the rst rating, the issuer could deviate and purchase the second one. In this case, given (B2), it can never be optimal to deviate and publish S 2 , unless S 1 is also published. Hence, for the deviation not to be pro table, we must have E [ max fp(S 1 ; S 2 ); p(S 1 )gj S 1 ] c 2 p(S 1 ); for all S 1 2 R or equivalently,
The r.h.s of (18) provides the expression forĉ l in the text. Since g(t) t > 0,
Xj2S and g 0 (t) = (t) > 0, it follows that:
From (19) it follows that max fc i ; c j g ĉ l is necessary for n 1 to be an equilibrium. On the other hand, upon observing a bad rating, the issuer could deviate from n 1 and publish zero ratings: then (B3-a) applies to n 0 for min fc i ; c j g ĉ h , in which case investors would price the asset p 0 , and the deviation would be pro table for all S i such that p(S i ) < p 0 . This shows min fc i ; c j g <ĉ h is also necessary for n 1 to be an equilibrium. In this case harsh beliefs (B3-b) sustain full disclosure. Finally, n 2 . Notice that condition (B3-a) applies to n 0 for min fc i ; c j g ĉ h and to n 1 for max fc i ; c j g ĉ l . Therefore full disclosure is sustained only if min fc i ; c j g <ĉ h and max fc i ; c j g <ĉ l ; which completes the proof of case i).
ii) Let c i = c j = c: We show that n 1 cannot be an equilibrium. With symmetric costs, there is no way for the players to coordinate on a particular rating being purchased. As a consequence, if only one rating is published, investor are not in the position to detect a deviation from the issuer. Hence, for the deviation not to be pro table, we must have E [ max fp(S i ; S j ); p(S i ); p(S j )gj S i ] c p(S i ); for all S i 2 R.
But then, for any c there exist a value of S i su ciently low such that the issuer nds it pro table to deviate and solicit the second rating. In fact,
Given that (20) is the ratio of two negative numbers and is less than one, the issuer will always nd it optimal to deviate and purchase the second rating if the value of the rst rating is low enough.
Proof of eq. (7)
First we derive the conditional distribution of the fundamental X given the information contained in the single disclosed rating S p when the issuer follows the strategy of the threshold equilibrium. Denote q (Sp) the conditional probability of selective disclosure given only one rating is published with value S p . Let A denote the event that is associated with selective disclosure, and let q =prob(S 1 < S \ S 2 S) denote the unconditional probability of A. Then,
Let B denote the event in which only one rating is published with value greater than S, so that prob(B) =prob(A [ S 1 S). Then, we compute the following probabilities
Denoting with A C the complement of A, we can use (21)-(25) to compute
and therefore, (26) and (21) imply
Using (22), (25) and (27), we can compute the posterior probability of A given one published rating with value equal to S p :
On the equilibrium path S p S, and therefore 1 Sp S = 1. The conditional density of X given S p is
Conditional on S p , the fundamental X follows the mixture distribution given in (30). Then, the expected utility of an agent with CARA preferences facing price P conditional on observing S p and demanding units of the asset is 13
Solving the integral in (31) using (30), we nd that maximizing (31) is equivalent to minimize
Di erentiating (32) with respect to , setting the derivative to zero, imposing = 1, solving for the price P and rearranging we nd
where ( ) is given in (6). The r.h.s of (33) provides the function p S (S p ) in the text.
Proof of Proposition 2
We derive necessary conditions on the equilibrium starting backwards from stage 2. If both ratings are su ciently low, the issuer could deviate and publish zero ratings. By (B3-a) , the deviation can be pro table only if c ĉ h , in which case investors price the asset at p 0 . Therefore, it has to be that c <ĉ h . Next, we derive the function s( ) and the constant c t . On the conjectured equilibrium path we have S 1 < S and S 2 2 R: We rst provide conditions under which publishing S 2 dominates publishing both ratings whenever S 2 S. We make use the following Lemma:
Lemma A1: Let S 2 R be de ned by p S (S ) = p(S ; S )
Then: i) S exists and is unique; ii) S < p 0 ; iii) p S ( S) p( S; S) , S S and iv) @ @S2 p S (S 2 ) > @ @S2 p (S2;S1) : Proof. 
From (35) and (12), we have
Then, if we denote t = t(S ; S );
(33) and (13) imply p S (S ) = p(S ; S ) , t + (t ) = 0:
Existence of S follows from (37) and lim t"1 (t) = lim t# 1 (t) = 0:
13 Initial wealth is normalized to zero.
Given that 0 (t) = (t) g(t) + t (t) + 1 ; t + (t ) = 0 , g(t ) + t = 0 , 0 (t ) = 0 then uniqueness follows from d dt (t + (t)) t=t = 1 + 0 (t ) = 1
ii) By (37) and (36) d dz (t(z; z) + (t(z; z))) < 0 iv) As (t) > 0 and is unimodal, we have 0 (t) > 0 for all t < t : From (35) it follows that for all S p S and S S we have t(S ; S ) t( S; S) t( S; S p ):
Lemma A1 implies the following necessary condition for the threshold S:
Only if (38) is satis ed the issuer, conditional on being in stage 2, nds it optimal to publish S 2 alone for all S 2 S:
In stage 1, whenever the realization of the rst purchased rating is S 1 S, the issuer might deviate from the conjectured strategy of publishing S 1 by purchasing the second rating. Then, some tedious calculations show the following Lemma Lemma A2 For all S 1 S, we have
Conditions (39)-(40) imply that the upper bound to the expected payo s from deviating and purchasing the second rating when S 1 S is obtained for S 1 = S: Therefore it is equal to
Given c and S, for the issuer not to deviate it has to be
Condition (41) 
In fact, only for c c t there exists some S S such that (43) holds. From the de nition ofĉ l in (17), we can writeĉ
S < p 0 implies p(S ) S , and the integrand in (42) valued at S is easily veri ed to greater than the integrand in (45), which implies c t >ĉ l :
Notice that, for c > c t , there exists an open interval of threshold values such that (38) is satis ed. To de ne such interval, for all c c t let s(c) be the value of the threshold such that (43) holds as an equality, that is,
Applying the implicit function theorem to (46) and using (41) shows that s(c) is a decreasing function. Also notice s(c t ) = S < p 0 . Then, by construction, for c > c t any S 2 [s(c); S ] is such that both (38) and (44) by (B3-a) investors would price the asset at p s(c) (Ŝ), which by construction is such that p s(c) (Ŝ) > p(Ŝ; s(c)), implying that the deviation is pro table. This reasoning therefore eliminate all S 2 (s(c); S ] as potential threshold equilibria. For S = s(c), if the issuer deviates and publishes only one rating below S, (B3-b) applies to such deviation, which in turn makes the deviation not pro table. For the same reason, in stage 1, if S = s(c) then the issuer cannot pro t from deviating and publishing S 1 conditional on S 1 < S.
It remains to show under which conditions the IPC is satis ed at all interim states as well as ex-ante, which yields the function v( ). From (13) and V > r 2 X , we have that for all S 1 ; S 2 p(S 1 ; S 2 ) > (S 1 ; S 2 ) V;
and, given S 2 S > S 1 , p S (S 2 ) > p( S; S 2 ) > p(S 1 ; S 2 ); implying the IPC is satis ed in all states at stage 2. In stage 1, upon observing S 1 S, the IPC is satis ed if (S 1 ) V p S (S1) . 
Upon observing S 1 < S, the IPC is satis ed if the outside option is not greater than the continuation payo , that is (S 1 ) V c + E p S (S 2 )1 S2 S + p(S 1 ; S 2 )1 S2< S S 1 ; Given that the r.h.s. of the last expression is maximized as S 1 # 1, then (49) is satis ed for all
Ex-ante, the IPC reads
where B denotes the set of states in which only one rating is published, and B c its complement.
Computing the expectation and and rearranging gives Then, the function v( ) is de ned to be the r.h.s. of (51) when S = s(c). Finally, it is easy to verify that if V is such that (51) holds, then also (48) and (50) hold. That is, if the IPC is satis ed ex-ante, then it is satis ed in any state along the path of the threshold equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 4.
By Lemma 3 and Proposition 2, the threshold strategy overlaps with the n 2 strategy whenever c t <ĉ h and c 2 [c t ;ĉ h ). But then, for these value of the costs, n 2 cannot be an equilibrium: upon observing two ratings, wheneverŜ =max(S 1 ; S 2 ) s(c) and min(S 1 ; S 2 ) < s(c), the issuer could deviate and publish onlyŜ. By (B3-a), the single ratingŜ is consistent with the issuer following the threshold equilibrium, so that the asset would be priced p s(c) (Ŝ). Given p s(c) (Ŝ) > p(Ŝ;Ŝ) the deviation is pro table.
Proof of Proposition 3.
1. Two ratings purchased and disclosed . From Lemma 4, n 2 can arise only if H < min fĉ t ;ĉ h g. Moreover, for the IPC to be satis ed ex-ante we must have H c 2 , where c 2 de ned in (10). In this equilibrium, the equilibrium at the fee-setting stage has the following from. For c 2 < min fĉ t ;ĉ h g ; RAs set fees as high as possible, namely c = c 2 such that the IPC binds with equality and extract all the surplus. RAs have no incentive to deviate as more expensive ratings would violate the IPC and not be purchased. For c 2 min fĉ t ;ĉ h g, there are two cases. If H ĉ l , then any c 2 [H; min fĉ t ;ĉ h g) constitutes an equilibrium in fees: if a RA deviates to a higher rating this would not be purchased by Lemma 3i). Similarly, for H <ĉ l , any c 2 [ĉ l ;ĉ h ) constitutes an equilibrium for the same reason.
2. Threshold equilibrium. Proposition 2 mandates c t <ĉ h , c 2 [c t ;ĉ h ) and V v(c): Competition in fees imposes an additional set of constraints. In this equilibrium, each RA expects its rating to be purchased with probability l 2 (1=2; 1). Therefore, any c > H is not an equilibrium in the fee-setting game. In fact, a RA could deviate to c 0 = c " 2 (H; c): by c c t >ĉ l and Lemma 3i) its rating would be purchased with probability one. Given l < 1 there is always an " > 0 small enough that c 0 > lc, making the deviation pro table. Instead, c = H is an equilibrium: any deviation to c 0 = c+" with " > 0 would result in the rating not being purchased, as implied by c 0 >c t >ĉ l and Lemma 3i). Therefore we must have H 2 [c t ;ĉ h ) and V v(H)
3. Zero ratings purchased . By Lemma 4, whenever c ĉ h the equilibrium in which no rating is purchased is viable. Therefore RAs would never charge fees as high asĉ h unless H ĉ h ; in which case any c H results in zero ratings being purchased.
4.
No trade. For c 2 < H <c orc H <ĉ h and V < v(c), none of the necessary conditions in 1-3 are met. For these parameters, let c = H: RAs make zero pro ts. Since either H > c 2 or H c > c l , deviating to a strictly higher rating implies that the (more expensive) rating would not be purchased.
Proof of Proposition 4.
We start by showing that the transparent outcome described in Proposition 1 cannot be an equilibrium for H <ĉ l if RAs can make the contact with the issuer opaque. From Proposition 1, in equilibrium RAs charge c = c l for H ĉ l and c = H for c l < H c h . Consider a RA that deviates by switching to opaque contact and fee c 0 = c + " <ĉ l . Since c 0 <ĉ l , Lemma 3 implies that the issuer cannot commit not to purchase the more expensive rating. Given the IPC is satis ed as a strict inequality in the transparent equilibrium, there always exists an " > 0 that makes the deviation pro table.
In the opaque case, consider a RA that deviates from the outcome described in Proposition 3 by simultaneously switching to a transparent contact and fee c 0 . Whenever undercutting is feasible (i.e., case 1 with c > H), it is not pro table. Therefore let c 0 c. Whenever in equilibrium ratings are purchased (cases 1-2), we haveĉ h > c >ĉ l . Givenĉ l > c l ; it is straightforward to verify that for the issuer would be strictly better o by purchasing and disclosing only one rating (as opposed to both in case 1 or more than one in expectation in case 2). If one rating is transparent, by the argument of the proof of Lemma 3i), the issuer can commit to purchase only one (the cheapest). Hence, it has to be c 0 = c, implying that the deviation cannot result in higher pro ts. In case 3, trivially no deviation can be pro table as H >ĉ h > c h : In case 4, for the deviation to be pro table we must have c 0 > H. But in this case we have H > c l , so again the issuer would purchase at most one rating, the cheapest of the two.
